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Abstract 
 
This study examines the role of globalization on terrorism in 51 African countries for the 
period 1996-2011. Four terrorism indicators are used, namely: domestic, transnational, 
unclear and total terrorism. Political, economic, social and general globalisation variables are 
employed and the empirical evidence is based on Fixed Effects regressions and Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM). Whereas the FE regressions are overwhelmingly not significant, 
the following findings are established from GMM estimations. Political globalisation 
increases both domestic and transnational terrorism. Social globalisation and general 
globalisation increase transnational terrorism. Economic globalisation reduces domestic 
terrorism. Political globalisation, social globalisation and general globalization positively 
affect unclear terrorism. Social globalisation has a positive impact on total terrorism. Possible 
channels and policy implications are discussed. 
 
JEL Classification: C52; D74; F30; F42; O55 
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1. Introduction 
 This inquiry which investigates the linkage between globalization and terrorism in 
Africa is motivated by two main factors, namely: increasing terrorism levels in Africa on the 
one hand and on the other hand, gaps in the literature on the relationship between 
globalization and terrorism.  
 First, there has been a recent positive wave of terrorist attacks across Africa due to: 
endemic corruption, tribal and ethnic tensions and religious fundamentalism (Asongu et al., 
2016; Alfa-Wali et al., 2015; Fazel, 2013). Unfortunately, despite the increasing incidences of 
terrorism, most of the media coverage and focus has substantially been skewed towards the 
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Middle East (see Clavarino, 2014). For instance, according to a recent report on the Global 
Terrorism Index (GTI, 2014), Nigeria’s Boko Haram represents the deadliest terrorist 
organisation with 6,644 deaths compared to the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) which 
accounts for 6,073 deaths. Some other notable terrorists’ movements on the continent include: 
Ansar Al-Shariya in Tunisia;  Ansar Dine, led by a former close ally of Gaddafi, Iyad Ag 
Ghaly; Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Al-Qaeda-linked Mulathameen Brigade led by 
the Algerian Mokhtar Belmokhtar.  
 Some contemporary examples of underlying terrorism activities in Africa include the:  
2013 Westgate shopping mall and 2015 Garissa University killings in Kenya by the Al-
Shabab; the Bardo National Museum and Sousse attacks in March and June 2015 in Tunisia 
respectively, from ISIL-affiliated Islamic fundamentalists; wave of Boko Haram attacks in  
neighboring countries like, Cameroon, Chad and Niger; November 2015 Radison Blu Hotel 
attack in Mali and Sinai Russian plane crash in Egypt in November 2015. 
 The increasing scale and scope of underlying terrorist activities can be the result of 
integration and/or globalization-related features. For example, the attacks in Tunisia have 
fundamentally targeted tourists from developed countries. Moreover, the  plethora of inherent 
weakenesses that Islamic fundamentalists (for the most part) are exploiting include: properous 
drug trade with a huge demand in Europe, from which profits are reinvested in the financing 
of terrorism; porous boders;  undertrained/underequipped armies because terrorist 
organisations can easily buy weapons in the Black market and corrupt/vulnerable government 
agents that can benefit from globalisation-flourishing tax havens by masterfully concealing 
funds meant to fight terrorism. Moreover, owing to porous boders that are facilitated by 
growing economic integration, the collapse of the Muammar Gaddafi’s Libyan regime in 
2011 has led to a sharp rise in Islamic militancy and insurgency in the Sahel region.  
 Despite the apparent linkage between globalisation and terorism, recent literature on 
the causes and consequences of terorism in Africa has fundamentally focused on: exploring 
the role of multilateral development institutions like the African Union (Ewi & Aning, 2006); 
investigating the role of competition by military companies on the rate at which conflicts are 
resolved (Akcinaroglu  & Radziszewski,  2013); examining  the impact of poverty and 
freedoms on terrorism (Barros et al., 2008); assessing the comparative African economics of 
governance in combating terrorism (Asongu et al., 2017) and investigating the influence of 
externalities like geopolitical fluctuations (Straus, 2012).  
We contribute to the last stream of literature by investigating how globalisation is 
influencing terrorism in Africa. In order to avail room for more policy implications, four 
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terrorism and globalisation variables are used respectively, namely: (i) domestic, 
transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics and (ii) political, social, economic and 
general globalisation indicators. The study in the literature closest to the current inquiry is 
Lutz and Lutz (2014) who have explored the connections between social, economic and 
political globalisation with terrorism, with particular emphasis on Africa. Unfortunately, the 
study is exploratory and recommends policy directions based on possible correlations that are 
not backed by statistical validity. Inferences based on explorations may be biased and policy 
recommendations based on possible correlations may be misguided because correlations are 
statistically fragile and falsifiable. We address these shortcomings by presenting empirical 
evidence that is based on robust causal linkages between globalisation and terrorism.  
Further to the stylized facts on the connection between globalisation and terrorism, 
Zimmermann (2011) has documented an interesting body of theoretical underpinnings on the 
globalisation-terrorism linkage. According to the author, the consequences of globalisation in 
terms of terrorism may take different forms, namely: religious-cultural, ethno-separatist and 
ideological. Globalisation within the framework is defined as an intensification and extension 
in exchange of ideas, persons and commodities (Held et al., 1999). According to the narrative, 
terrorism is related to globalisation because of the spreading of ideas, mobility of people and 
increased financial and trade transactions. Terrorism in the narrative: (i) is fundamentally 
motivated by information asymmetry about time, place and the number of victims attacked 
and (ii) consists of fear-motivating violent attacks that target civilians with the purpose of 
influencing polity and political decisions. The definition of terrorism underlying the 
theoretical underpinnings advanced by Zimmermann (2011) is not very different from that of 
Enders and Sandler (2006) employed in this study: the actual and threatened use of force by 
subnational actors with the purpose of employing intimidation to meet political objectives. 
In addition to the highlighted theoretical underpinnings, globalisation could nurse, 
habour and fuel terrorism because of numerous logical reasons (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 
2017a). (i) Globalisation can encourage religious fundamentalism because three decades ago, 
religious terrorist cults were very not apparent in the world. (ii) Corollary to the preceding 
point, gloabalisation can produce sophisticated cross-country networks of terrorist 
organisations. In this vein, Al-Qaeda and ISIL can be considered as some kind of franchising 
agencies that work via religious internationalisation/globalisation and/or networks that are 
state-less. (iii) Globalisation has produced an international political economy wherein two 
types of nation states exist. On the one hand, industralized and advanced economies influence 
less developed/industralised economies politico-economically. From the political dimension, 
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calls for ‘regime change’ are a one way street: from developed to developing/poor African 
countries. From the economic angle, biased policies of globalisation that are dictated by 
developed countries constraint poor/African countries to remain suppliers of raw materials 
(see Stiglitz, 2007; Mshomba, 2011).  (iv) Globalisation can influence terrorism from a socio-
cultural angle because elements of terrorism may perceive the phenomenon as  harmful to 
their system of values and cultures. The literal translation of  ‘Boko Haram’ is ‘No to Western 
Education/Civilisation’. Hence, the belief that Western commodities have negative influences 
on local people can be a cause of terrorism.   
In the light of the above, the hypothesis tested in this study is the following:  social, 
political, economic, general dimensions of  globalisation fuel terrorism. It is important to 
substantiate the framing of this hypothesis with a clarification of globalisation concepts that 
are consistent with: (i) the engaged theoretical and empirical literature and (ii) the empirical 
analysis that follows this introduction.  Consistent with Dreher et al. (2010): (i) economic 
globalization consists of the long distance flow of commodities (i.e. goods and services) and 
capital, including perceptions and information that accompany such market exchanges; (ii) 
social globalization can be understood in terms of the spread of people, images, information 
and ideas and (iii) political globalization is encapsulated in the diffusion of government 
policies.  
The rest of the study is structured as follows.  Section 2 discusses the data and 
methodology while Section 3 presents the empirical results and corresponding discussion. 
Section 4 concludes with future research directions.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data  
 This paper examines a panel of 51 African countries with data for the period 1996-
2011 from Dreher et al. (2010), Enders et al. (2011), Gailbulloev et al. (2012) and World 
Bank Development Indictors. The sample and periodicity are constrained by data availability. 
Accordingly, the political stability indicator used as control variable is only available from 
1996 while 2011 is the end-year because data for most variables is not available after this 
year. It is important to note that the proposed terrorism variables are based on a 
decomposition method of the global index from original sources like the GTD (Global 
terrorism database) and ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events). 
Dreher et al. (2010) also discuss issues in the  measurement of globalization. For lack of 
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space, the interested reader can find issues surrounding the measurement of globalization in 
the corresponding study.  
 The globalization independent variables from Greher et al. (2010) are: social 
globalization; economic globalization; political globalization and general globalization. Four 
distinct but related terrorism variables from Enders et al. (2011) and Gailbulloev et al. (2012) 
are used: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism variables.Terrorism which is the 
actual and threatened use of force by subnational actors with the purpose of employing 
intimation to meet political objectives (Enders & Sandler, 2006), is measured in terms of the 
number of yearly terrorists incidents registered  by a given country. In order to address 
concerns that are related to the positive skew and log tansformation of zeros, the data is 
improved by first adding one to the base and then taking the natural logarithm of the number 
of terrorist attacks. This transformation has been recently employed in recent literature (Choi 
& Salehyan, 2013;  Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Efobi & Asongu, 2016; Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016a).  
Terrorism-specific definitions are from Efobi et al. (2015, p. 6). Domestic terrorism 
“includes all incidences of terrorist activities that involves the nationals of the venue country: 
implying that the perpetrators, the victims, the targets and supporters are all from the venue 
country” (p.6). Transnational terrorism is “terrorism including those acts of terrorism that 
concerns at least two countries. This implies that the perpetrator, supporters and incidence 
may be from/in one country, but the victim and target is from another”.  Unclear terrorism is 
that, “which constitutes incidences of terrorism that can neither be defined as domestic nor 
transnational terrorism” (p.6). Total terrorism is the sum of domestic, transnational and 
unclear dimensions of terrorism.  
Five main control variables are used, namely: internet penetration; inclusive 
development in terms of the inequality adjusted human development index; Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) growth; political stability and military expenditure. From a preliminary 
investigation, accounting for more than six control variables (including the lagged dependent 
variable) leads to the proliferation of instruments and hence, invalidity of estimated 
coefficients. We discuss expected signs of control variables in chronological order. 
First, Argomaniz (2015) and Holbrook (2015) have established that internet is relevant 
in the coordination of terrorists’ activities and recruitment of terrorists. Second, with regard to 
inclusive development, there is a bulk of literature maintaining that adherence to and 
sympathy for terrorists’ entities is traceable to exclusive development (see Bass, 2014). This 
position is backed by Foster (2014) who has substantiated that the feeling of socio-economic 
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exclusion is a fundamental factor pushing Western-born and -educated youths to join ISIL. In 
Nigeria for instance, one of the factors behind the burgeoning Boko Haram in the Northern 
region is traceable to the Northern region’s less development, compared to the Southern 
regions.  
Third, economic prosperity in terms of economic growth could decrease the likelihood 
of  social unrests (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b)  and terrorism because, GDP growth: (i) 
increases avenues for employment and social mobility and (ii) boosts government revenue 
needed to fight terrorism. This narrative is consistent with Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) who 
have maintained that compared to low-income countries, their high-income counterparts have 
more financial resources with which to prevent and absorb economic shocks related to 
terrorism.  
Fourth, political stability is likely to reduce terrorism for two reasons: one intuitive, 
the other theoretical. On the theoretical front, the political access theory of Eyerman (1998) 
argues that countries that are politically stable are less linked to terrorist activities. From the 
intuitive angle, political stability provides a non-violent atmosphere that is less favourable for 
the harbour of terrorism. Fifth, there is a substantial body of literature on the role of military 
expenditure in combating terrorism (see Sandler, 2005; Lum et al., 2006; Feridum & Shahbaz, 
2010). 
 The sources of variables and full definitions are provided in Appendix 1. The 
summary statistics and correlation matrix are provided in Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 
respectively. From the summary statistics, it can be broadly established that the variables are 
comparable and from corresponding standards deviation (though some are relative small), we 
can be confident that reasonable estimated linkages would emerge.  In essence, the 
comparatively smaller variations (or standard deviations) are consistent with the units of 
corresponding means (or averages) of the same variables. Hence, this should intuitively not 
affect the quality of the estimation. The number of observations also differs across variables 
because of missing degrees of freedom. However, the issue of missing observations does not 
undermine the estimations because on the one hand, many estimation techniques are based on 
unbalanced panels data structures and on the other hand, the regression output is 
approximately based on a balanced dataset, contingent on the number of observations in the 
regression output. This is the case with the GMM approach in which the total number of 
observations in the regression output is not significantly different.   
While a few outliers are also apparent, these outliers do not significantly affect the 
results. For instance, whereas the maximum value of GDP growth is 106%, the corresponding 
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standard deviation is not substantially different from the mean value in terms of units, 
notably: the maximum value is in units of hundreds while the mean and standard deviations 
are neither in the units of tens nor hundreds. It is important to note that, a more than 100% 
GDP growth is not uncommon for a post-war economy like Liberia which registered a 106% 
growth rate in 19971.  
African countries have low globalization indicators which can possibly affect investigated 
linkages, when compared with relatively more developed economies with higher levels of 
globalization. It is important to note that the underlying difference in effect has been 
documented to be more structural than idiosyncratic. For example, McMillan (2013) has 
observed that the structural changes in Africa may not be the result of globalisation. Structural 
changes are medium and long term changes that require a multitude of economic actors. This 
is not the case with terrorism because a terrorist act can be perpetrated by an individual who 
gets up from bed (and without any complex planning) decides to resort to terrorism in order to 
materialise a grievance that is fuelled by globalisation.   
The correlation matrix indicates that there are not substantial issues of high degrees of 
substitution (three in three strands, terrorism, globalisation, and control variables) 
 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 Instrumental Variable Fixed Effects regressions 
For the purpose of simplicity, common sense and evidence from the literature, the study 
assumes the presence of endogeneity2. Recent terrorism literature has shown that estimated 
effects become apparent when the corresponding specifications are tailored to control for 
                                                 
1
 The interested reader can find more information on the following link: 
https://tradingeconomics.com/liberia/gdp-growth-annual  
2
 According to Asongu et al. (2017), the concern of endogeneity is very fundamental in regressions. This is 
essentially why most regression techniques are designed to address the underlying concern. For example, the use 
of Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) addresses endogeneity of: (i) simultaneity through an 
instrumentation process and (ii) the unobserved heterogeneity by controlling for time invariant omitted variables. 
The GMM technique is employed subsequently. It is important to note that Krieger and Meierrieks (2015) have 
used instruments to address the potential concern of endogeneity, which they found not be so large. Given that 
variables of interest are different in this study on the one hand and on the other hand, the level of aggregated data 
(i.e. index variables) is not a sufficient condition for the assumption of endogeniety, it is relevant to present more 
arguments on the assumption and source of endogeneity. These clarifications also guide in the choice of 
instrumental variables. First, terrorism could be related to specific time periods. Hence, the need to account for 
such unobserved heterogeneity. To this end, we control for time specific effects in two ways: as control variables 
and as strictly exogenous variables in the identification process. Second, while globalization can affect terrorism, 
terrorism can also affect globalization policies, notably: decisions by countries to embrace more political, 
economic and social openness. This concern of reverse causality is addressed in this study by accounting for 
simultaneity through instrumentation with forward orthogonal deviations.   
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endogeneity (see Krieger & Meierrieks, 2015; Asongu et al., 2017)3.  Eq. (1) below represents 
an instrumental variable (IV) fixed effects (FE) specification.  
 
tititih
h
htiti WIVGT ,,,
5
1
,10,   
                                         
(1)  
 
where, tiT , , is a terrorism variable (domestic, transnational, unclear or total) of country i
 
at  
period t ;  tiG ,
 
denotes a measurement of globalisation (political, economic, social or total); 
0 is a constant;
 
W  is the vector of control variables  (internet penetration, GDP growth, 
political stability, inclusive development and military expenditure),
 
i
 
is the country-specific 
effect, t
 
is the time-specific constant, ti ,  the error term, tiIVG , , represents an  instrumented 
globalisation indicator  in country i
 
at  period t  . The instrumentation procedure is as follows 
in Eq. (2):  
  titijti GG ,1,,   
 
                                                                   (2) 
The instrumentation procedure consists of regressing each globalisation variable on its first 
lag and then saving the fitted values that are subsequently used as the main independent 
variable in Eq. (1). The specifications are Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent 
(HAC) in standard errors. The instrumentation procedure is in accordance with recent 
literature on terrorism (Asongu et al., 2017). 
 
2.2.2 GMM:  Specification, identification and exclusion restrictions  
Previous terrorism literature has employed: logistic regressions (Kavanagh, 2011; Bhavani, 
2011);  Ordinary Least Squares (Tavares, 2004; Bravo & Dias, 2006); the multilevel Poisson 
model (Lee, 2013);  Zero-inflated Negative and Negative Binomial regressions (Drakos & 
Gofas, 2006; Savun & Phillips, 2009) and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
(Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014). The inquiry adopts the GMM strategy for four main reasons. 
First, the T<N basic criterion for its employment is met because 16 (or 2011-1996 periodicity) 
<51 (or number of countries). Second, the empirical strategy accounts for endogeneity in all 
the regressors. Third, cross-country variations are not restricted in the estimation approach. 
Fourth, biases from small samples that are typical of the ‘difference estimator’ are addressed 
                                                 
3
 It is also relevant to note that while Krieger and Meierrieks (2015) have used negative binomial regressions in 
dealing with this issue of over-dispersion (i.e. variances larger than corresponding means) in the terrorism 
variables, GMM can also be employed if the terrorism variables are log-normalized. This approach is consistent 
with recent terrorism literature (see Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Asongu et al., 2018a, 2018b).  
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by the system GMM approach. It is essentially for this reason that Bond et al. (2001) have 
recommended the system GMM approach  (Arellano & Bover,1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998)  
instead of the difference GMM strategy (Arellano & Bond, 1991). 
 In this study, the Roodman (2009ab) extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) with 
forward orthogonal deviations (as opposed to first differences) is employed because it has 
been documented to limit some issues that are inherent in the system GMM approach, namely: 
(i) over-identification or proliferation of instruments and (ii) neglect of cross-sectional 
dependence (see Love & Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008; Boateng et al., 2017). In the 
specification, we adopt a two-step procedure because it accounts for heteroscedasticity. The 
one-step procedure is consistent with homoscedasticity.  
The following equations in levels (2) and first difference (3) summarize the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
 tititih
h
htititi WGTT ,,,
5
1
,2,10,    

                                                           (2)
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where, tiT ,
 
is a terrorism indicator (domestic, transnational, unclear or total terrorism) of 
country i
 
at  period t ; tiG , , represents an indicator of globalisation  (which could be political, 
economic, social or general); 0
 
is a constant;
 
 denotes the degree of auto-regression; W  is 
the vector of control variables  (internet penetration, GDP growth, political stability, inclusive 
development and military expenditure),
 
i
 
is the country-specific effect, t
 
is the time-
specific constant  and ti ,  the error term. 
 Consistent with recent literature (see Dewan & Ramaprasad, 2014; Tchamyou & 
Asongu, 2017), all the independent indicators are considered as suspected endogeneous or 
predetermined variables. Hence, the gmmstyle is used to treat the suspected endogenous 
variables and only years are treated as strictly exogenous. The strategy for treating the 
corresponding ivstyle (years) is ‘iv(years, eq(diff))’ because it is not likely for years to 
become endogenous in first-difference (see Roodman, 2009b). 
 In order to address concerns about simultaneity, lagged regressors are employed as 
instruments for the forward-differenced indicators. Within this framework, Helmet 
transformations are used in order to remove fixed effects. The empirical strategy which is 
consistent with Love and Zicchino (2006) entails the computation of forward mean-variations 
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of the variables. Therefore, the average of all future observations are deducted from the 
variables as opposed to subtracting past observations from the present ones (Roodman, 2009b, 
p. 104). The transformations enable orthogonal or parallel conditions between lagged 
observations and forward-differenced values. Irrespective of lag numbers, in order to limit 
data loss, with the exception of the last observation for each country, the transformations are 
performed for all values. “And because lagged observations do not enter the formula, they are 
valid as instruments” (Roodman (2009b, p. 104). 
 Given the above clarification, years influence terrorism exclusively through the 
endogenous explaining, suspected endogenous or predetermined variables. The statistical 
validity of the exclusion restriction is investigated with the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) 
for instrument exogeneity. In essence, the alternative hypothesis of the DHT should be 
rejected for the instruments to elucidate terrorism exclusively via the suspected endogenous 
indicators. Accordingly, in the standard Instrumental Variable (IV) approach, the failure to 
reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test means that the 
instruments do not explain the outcome variable beyond the predetermined variables (see 
Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016c; Beck et al., 2003). However, in the GMM strategy with 
forward orthogonal deviations, the information criterion for exclusion restriction is the DHT. 
Hence, the exclusion restriction is confirmed if the null hypothesis of the DHT corresponding 
to IV (year, eq(diff)) is not rejected. 
 
3. Empirical results  
3.1 Baseline Fixed Effects regressions  
Table 1 presents results from the FE estimations. Whereas Panel A shows findings on 
domestic and transnational terrorism, Panel B displays results corresponding to unclear and 
total terrorism. With the exception of two specifications in regressions pertaining to 
transnational terrorism, the estimated coefficients corresponding to the globalization 
independent variables of interest are not overwhelmingly significant. Moreover, the 
coefficients of determination (i.e. Adjusted R²) have a very low explanatory power on the one 
hand and on the other hand, some models (e.g. specifications related to unclear terrorism) are 
not valid (i.e. insignificant Fisher statistics).  Most of the significant control variables have the 
expected signs. Accordingly, political stability and inclusive development are expected to 
negatively affect terrorism. In order to have a more comprehensive assessment of the 
globalization-terrorism nexus, we extend the analysis using the Generalised Method of 
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Moments (GMM). The use of GMM is consistent with recent literature on the governance-
terrorism nexus (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017b).   
 
Table  1: Fixed effects regressions on the nexus between globalisation and terror 
         
 Panel A : Domestic and Transnational Terrorism (Dependent variables) 
         
 
Domestic Terrorism  Transnational Terrorism   
         
Constant  0.453 0.449 0.479 0.395 -0.171 0.057 -0.294 -0.279 
 (0.241) (0.306) (0.307) (0.405) (0.532) (0.854) (0.379) (0.409) 
Political Globalisation (IV) 0.001 --- --- --- 0.005* --- --- --- 
 (0.728)    (0.069)    
Economic Globalisation (IV)   --- 0.002 --- --- --- 0.001 --- --- 
  (0.696)    (0.776)   
Social Globalisation (IV) --- --- 0.002 --- --- --- 0.015* --- 
   (0.870)    (0.088)  
Globalisation (IV) --- --- --- 0.003 --- --- --- 0.010 
    (0.697)    (0.106) 
Internet  0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.0008 0.001 
 (0.253) (0.378) (0.289) (0.340) (0.578) (0.476) (0.867) (0.831) 
GDP growth  0.004 0.001 0.004 0.004 -0.002 -0.0004 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.546) (0.862) (0.556) (0.576) (0.589) (0.946) (0.494) (0.484) 
Political Stability  -0.362*** -0.419*** -0.361*** -0.364*** -0.273*** -0.303*** -0.272*** -0.278*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inclusive Development  -0.316* -0.318* -0.311* -0.317* -0.105 -0.087 -0.092 -0.103 
 (0.068) (0.073) (0.071) (0.067) (0.393) (0.487) (0.450) (0.403) 
Military Expenditure  0.059 0.061 0.058 0.058 0.014 0.018 0.011 0.010 
 (0.116) (0.136) (0.121) (0.120) (0.600) (0.525) (0.677) (0.691) 
         
Adj.  R²(within) 0.066 0.074 0.066 0.066 0.064 0.058 0.063 0.062 
Fisher  3.67*** 3.84*** 3.65*** 3.67*** 3.53*** 3.00*** 3.46*** 2.59** 
Countries  37 34 37 37 37 34 37 37 
Observations  351 328 351 351 351 328 351 351 
         
         
 Panel B : Unclear and Total Terrorism (Dependent variables) 
         
 
Uuclear Terrorism  Total Terrorism   
         
Constant  0.031 -0.035 -0.036 0.017 0.266 0.418 0.267 0.124 
 (0.829) (0.825) (0.837) (0.922) (0.521) (0.374) (0.598) (0.808) 
Political Globalisation (IV) -0.0005 --- --- --- 0.006 --- --- --- 
 (0.732)    (0.672)    
Economic Globalisation (IV)   --- 0.0009 --- --- --- 0.005 --- --- 
  (0.728)    (0.520)   
Social Globalisation (IV) --- --- 0.001 --- --- --- 0.012 --- 
   (0.791)    (0.357)  
Globalisation (IV) --- --- --- -0.0004 --- --- --- 0.012 
    (0.900)    (0.206) 
Internet  -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.350) (0.244) (0.283) (0.376) (0.672) (0.748) (0.762) (0.888) 
GDP growth  -0.0008 -0.002 -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.770) (0.445) (0.749) (0.780) (0.865) (0.895) (0.808) (0.766) 
Political Stability  -0.076** -0.100** -0.078** -0.077** -0.447*** -0.519*** -0.443*** -0.453*** 
 (0.041) (0.014) (0.037) (0.041) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inclusive Development  0.005 0.0006 0.002 0.004 -0.338* -0.326* -0.320* -0.337* 
 (0.929) (0.992) (0.970) (0.947) (0.070) (0.087) (0.085) (0.071) 
Military Expenditure  0.011 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.070* 0.074* 0.066 0.066 
 (0.427) (0.535) (0.405) (0.410) (0.085) (0.092) (0.102) (0.103) 
         
Adj.  R²(within) 0.025 0.032 0.024 0.024 0.083 0.090 0.080 0.082 
Fisher  1.32 1.61 1.31 1.30 4.68*** 4.77*** 4.50*** 4.63*** 
Countries  37 34 37 37 37 34 37 37 
Observations  351 328 351 351 351 384 351 351 
         
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Adj: Adjusted. IV: Instrumental Variable.   
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3. 2 Analysis with Generalised Method of Moments  
Table 2 presents findings on domestic terrorism and transnational terrorism whereas, Table 3 
shows findings for unclear and total terrorism. For either table, four principal information 
criteria are used to examine the validity of the GMM model4. The following findings can be 
established from Table 2. (i) Political globalisation increases both domestic and transnational 
terrorism. (ii) Social globalisation and general globalisation increase transnational terrorism. 
(iii) Economic globalisation reduces domestic terrorism. (iv) Most of the significant control 
variables have the expected signs. The unexpected positive sign from the ‘military 
expenditure’ estimate is consistent with a strand of literature on the view that military 
mechanisms  to fight terrorism have opposite effects because they further fuel terrorism for 
the most part (see  Sandler, 2005; Lum et al., 2006; Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010). 
 The following findings can be established from Table 3. (i) Political globalisation, 
social globalisation and general globalisation positively affect unclear terrorism. (ii) Social 
globalisation has a positive impact on total terrorism. (iii) Most of the significant control 
variables have the expected signs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for the absence 
of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen overidentification restrictions 
(OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not 
correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the 
Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, 
we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in 
Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. 
Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2017, p.200). 
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Table 2: Domestic and Transnational Terrorism    
         
 Dependent variables: Domestic and Transnational Terrorism  
         
 
Domestic Terrorism  Transnational Terrorism   
         
Constant  -0.576*** 0.064 -0.601** -0.217 -0.473*** -0.253** -0.374*** -0.821*** 
 (0.000) (0.709) (0.035) (0.483) (0.008) (0.037) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic  Terrorism (-1) 0.349*** 0.263*** 0.313*** 0.279*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)     
Transnational Terrorism (-1) --- --- --- --- 0.223*** 0.217*** 0.238*** 0.235*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Globalisation  0.006** --- --- --- 0.006** --- --- --- 
 (0.017)    (0.010)    
Economic Globalisation   --- -0.012* --- --- --- 0.003 --- --- 
  (0.093)    (0.141)   
Social Globalisation   --- --- 0.015 --- --- --- 0.014*** --- 
   (0.112)    (0.003)  
Globalisation  --- --- --- 0.002 --- --- --- 0.021*** 
    (0.754)    (0.000) 
Internet  -0.0008 0.016* -0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.005 -0.008** 
 (0.900) (0.056) (0.614) (0.728) (0.659) (0.707) (0.185) (0.013) 
GDP growth  0.0007 0.006 0.004 0.003 -0.003** -0.002 -0.001 -0.004*** 
 (0.878) (0.190) (0.277) (0.497) (0.016) (0.221) (0.215) (0.003) 
Political Stability  -0.302*** -0.460*** -0.513*** -0.395*** -0.298*** -0.266*** -0.297*** -0.174** 
 (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) 
Inclusive Development  0.006*** 0.072 0.003 0.008** 0.0004 0.009 -0.004* -0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.292) (0.483) (0.017) (0.636) (0.648) (0.078) (0.000) 
Military Expenditure  0.087*** 0.132*** 0.083** 0.077** 0.035** 0.035* 0.018 0.004 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.017) (0.043) (0.046) (0.086) (0.391) (0.785) 
         
AR(1) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) 
AR(2) (0.169) (0.327) (0.240) (0.221) (0.178) (0.171) (0.185) (0.132) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.621) (0.131) (0.446) (0.717) 
Hansen OIR (0.512) (0.494) (0.404) (0.461) (0.256) (0.364) (0.171) (0.226) 
         
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.043) (0.034) (0.218) (0.035) (0.347) (0.281) (0.661) (0.513) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.972) (0.979) (0.564) (0.966) (0.256) (0.443) (0.082) (0.157) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.235) (0.326) (0.383) (0.309) (0.419) (0.140) (0.362) (0.523) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.769) (0.617) (0.420) (0.590) (0.203) (0.727) (0.138) (0.127) 
         
Fisher  1426.50*** 693.06*** 2283.73*** 17033.13*** 571.04*** 165.91*** 1295.64*** 3851.63*** 
Instruments  37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
Countries  37 34 37 37 37 34 37 37 
Observations  351 328 351 351 351 328 351 351 
         
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; 
b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests.  
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Table 3: Unclear and Total Terrorism    
         
 Dependent variables: Domestic and Transnational Terrorism  
         
 
Unclear Terrorism Total  Terrorism 
         
Constant  -0.091** -0.025 -0.171*** -0.161* -0.197 0.345 -0.892*** -0.747** 
 (0.044) (0.781) (0.009) (0.057) (0.398) (0.253) (0.002) (0.023) 
Unclear Terrorism (-1) 0.050*** 0.026* 0.044*** 0.030* --- --- --- --- 
 (0.002) (0.093) (0.001) (0.062)     
Total Terrorism (-1) --- --- --- --- 0.423*** 0.328*** 0.422*** 0.406*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Globalisation  0.001** --- --- --- 0.005 --- --- --- 
 (0.029)    (0.101)    
Economic Globalisation   --- 0.00008 --- --- --- -0.010 --- --- 
  (0.973)    (0.170)   
Social Globalisation   --- --- 0.006*** --- --- --- 0.025*** --- 
   (0.002)    (0.008)  
Globalisation  --- --- --- 0.004*** --- --- --- 0.015 
    (0.006)    (0.111) 
Internet  -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.003** -0.001* 0.001 0.013 -0.012** -0.005 
 (0.432) (0.631) (0.023) (0.088) (0.834) (0.139) (0.045) (0.361) 
GDP growth  -0.0003 -0.003 -0.0008 -0.001* -0.002 0.00003 0.005 -0.00008 
 (0.816) (0.105) (0.331) (0.071) (0.607) (0.996) (0.287) (0.987) 
Political Stability  0.020 -0.079** -0.042 -0.020 -0.224* -0.323*** -0.441*** -0.265** 
 (0.605) (0.046) (0.248) (0.601) (0.058) (0.007) (0.005) (0.015) 
Inclusive Development  -0.001*** -0.003 -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.003 0.054 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.692) (0.000) (0.000) (0.241) (0.342) (0.393) (0.833) 
Military Expenditure  0.014*** 0.019** 0.009 0.009* 0.041* 0.088*** 0.040* 0.043** 
 (0.008) (0.015) (0.149) (0.079) (0.070) (0.003) (0.081) (0.035) 
         
AR(1) (0.037) (0.035) (0.030) (0.030) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
AR(2) (0.131) (0.110) (0.116) (0.115) (0.096) (0.140) (0.137) (0.100) 
Sargan OIR (0.656) (0.873) (0.949) (0.798) (0.148) (0.077) (0.081) (0.108) 
Hansen OIR (0.594) (0.947) (0.952) (0.930) (0.079) (0.158) (0.198) (0.160) 
         
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.910) (0.945) (0.905) (0.934) (0.046) (0.015) (0.260) (0.071) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.318) (0.808) (0.851) (0.775) (0.282) (0.744) (0.236) (0.419) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.651) (0.965) (0.888) (0.725) (0.142) (0.073) (0.271) (0.169) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.435) (0.702) (0.840) (0.913) (0.141) (0.498) (0.230) (0.276) 
         
Fisher  36.94*** 87.94*** 260.48*** 80.45*** 26112*** 122.80*** 12610*** 32547.17*** 
Instruments  37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
Countries  37 34 37 37 37 34 37 37 
Observations  351 328 351 351 351 328 351 351 
         
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; 
b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests.  
 
 
 
 
3.3 Discussion of results and policy implications 
 
 We set-out to investigate the hypothesis that globalization affects terrorism in order to 
complement a recent stream of the literature that is based on explorations and correlations. 
The findings confirm that the correlations established by the underlying stream of studies can 
be extended to causality. Hence, the findings are broadly consistent with Lutz and Lutz (2014, 
2015) who have concluded on a positive nexus in Africa and the Middle East. It follows that 
globalization has non-tradable externalities that like ‘individual value formation’ and social 
values, have some influence on individuals’ orientation to leadership and can shape 
resentments against political, economic and social orders that are dictated by more powerful 
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countries for the most part. Within this framework, terrorism becomes a weapon for less 
privileged groups who may resort to violence as a means of making their voices heard.  
 The findings have confirmed the Davis (2010) postulate that “there is little doubt that 
globalization positively impacted the expansion and threat of transnational terrorism in 
Africa” (p. 141). Such impact has possibly been facilitated by the burgeoning information and 
communication technology across the continent that is accelerating the conjunction of people, 
culture and ideas. Therefore, it is not surprising that such movement of material and ideas can 
facilitate collective actions by groups that aim to use violence in voicing their grievances. We 
now engage globalisation-specific discourses in the following order: ‘economic globalisation 
and terrorism’, ‘political globalisation and terrorism’ and ‘social globalisation and terrorism’.   
First, we have shown that economic globalisation exceptionally reduces domestic 
terrorism. This confirms the postulate of Li and Schaub (2006) that globalisation does not 
always have negative impacts, but could be engendering some nexuses with the world system 
that reduces the levels in terrorism. Whereas Bangura (2010, p. 129) has postulated that the 
globalization-oriented “destabilizing factors and uncertainties in the global arena are 
increasing”, we argue based on the findings that some nations may also gain from stability as 
a result of increasing globalisation. A case in point is the resilience of Africa to the 2008 
global economic crisis. It is important to understand this narrative in the light of the fact that 
the Arab Spring and terrorism externalities fundamentally resulted from Western politically-
motivated interest of spreading democracy (Hehir, 2015). Today, Tunisia is relatively 
politically-stable, though terrorism still looms with the recent Bardo National Museum and 
Sousse attacks in March and June 2015 respectively. Egypt has returned to military rule and 
the law of the land in post-Gaddafi Libya is being dictated by both terrorist entities and rival 
governments. After highlighting the ‘political globalization’ dimension of the Arab Spring,  it 
is now relevant to engage it in the light of our findings. This is essentially because the United 
Nations (UN) Security Council that played a fundamental role in this destabilization is 
included in our definition of political globalization (Bellamy, 2011). 
Second, on the connection between political globalization and terrorism in Africa, the 
former concept, as defined in Appendix 1 captures the number of foreign embassies in a 
country, participation in the UN Security Council, membership in international organizations, 
inter alia. We have established from the findings that political globalization increases 
domestic, transnational and unclear dimensions of terrorism. The fact that African countries 
make-up close to 20% of the world’s population and do not have a permanent seat at the UN 
Security Council to influence world decisions (that affect the destiny of Africa) cannot be 
17 
 
ruled-out as a potential motivation for terrorism  (especially transnational terrorism). This is 
essentially because the Washington Consensus prioritizes political governance (or political 
rights)5, yet some of its influential institutions are undemocratic. This narrative is consistent 
with the conclusions of Savun and Phillips (2009) that transnational terrorism is fueled for the 
most part by grievances that are linked to the foreign policy of wealthy nations. It is important 
to substantiate the economic and political narratives with a politico-economic narrative in 
order to put the stance of Africa into greater perspective.  
 From a politico-economic front, it is very likely that some entities in Africa resort to 
terrorism as means of making their voices heard because globalisation has brought about the 
development of an international political economy that emphasises two principal groups of 
nation states: the first group of advanced industrialised countries and a second group which 
includes Africa consisting of poor and less industrialised countries. Politics has been used to 
skew economic globalisation to the advantage of developed countries. African countries have 
been constrained to produce raw materials for the most part. For instance, in ‘Making 
Globalization Work’,  Stiglitz (2007) articulates that “The average European cow gets a 
subsidy of $2 a day; more than half of the people in the developing world live on less than 
that. It appears that it is better to be a cow in Europe than to be a poor person in a 
developing country” (p. 85). Furthermore, “Without subsidies, it would not pay for the Unites 
States to produce cotton; with them, the United States is, as we have noted, the world's largest 
cotton exporter" (p.85). The Chang (2008) ‘Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the 
Secret History of Capitalism’ and the Mshomba (2011) narrative on relations between the 
World Trade Organization and Africa, aptly confirm that African countries are in the group of 
weak/poor/’less industrialized countries that are not benefiting from a globalization project 
that is designed by powerful/rich countries for the purpose of maintaining their hegemony.  In 
the light of the above, it is not surprising that terrorism is used by weak nations to voice their 
frustrations of being unsuccessful at the international and local market places. 
 Third, on the link between social globalization and terrorism, based on the established 
findings, it is reasonable to infer that terror organizations in Africa have the belief that 
globalization-fuelled Western commodities are negatively affecting their communities, 
notably: their cultures and values as well as the way they behave. This narrative is also related 
to the perspective that some products associated with globalization (like the internet) are used 
                                                 
5The interested reader can find more insights in Asongu and Ssozi (2016) and Asongu (2016) who have reviewed 
and reconciled dominant schools of thought on Sino-African relations as well as priorities of the two dominant 
models of contemporary development, namely: the Washington Consensus which prioritizes political rights and 
the Beijing Model that prioritizes economic rights.  
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to promote Western culture and despise African values. Religion is one of such elements that 
reacts negatively to such challenges. To put this point into perspective, the Boko Haram (or 
Western Education is Forbidden) that is growing in Nigeria and neighboring countries is just 
an example of how terrorists can respond to increasing exposure to Western culture and 
disregard for indigenous culture. As shown by Eveslage (2013), globalization-fuelled 
economic dislocations have marginalized the northern Nigerian region and her population 
which consists of Muslims for the most part. This ensuing loss of  both economic and social 
statuses has pushed the youth to follow leaderships like Boko Haram, which is increasing its 
international links for a broader jihad and attacking all agents it deems complicit in the 
advancement of foreign culture that undermine the Islamic religion (see Forest, 2011). Two 
contradictions of Boko Haram are worth articulating in order to balance the narrative. On the 
one hand, Islam which it defends is not traditionally an African/indigenous religion. On the 
other hand, the terrorist organization relies on Western education and logistics to wage its 
war.   
 
5. Conclusion and future research directions 
 
 This study has examined the role of globalization on terrorism in 51 African countries 
for the period 1996-2011. Four terrorism indicators are used, namely: domestic, transnational, 
unclear and total terrorism. Political, economic, social and general globalisation variables are 
employed and the empirical evidence is based on Fixed Effects (FE) and Generalised Method 
of Moments (GMM) regressions. Whereas the FE regressions are overwhelmingly not 
significant, the following findings have been established from GMM estimations. Political 
globalisation increases both domestic and transnational terrorism.  Social globalisation and 
general globalisation increase transnational terrorism. Economic globalisation reduces 
domestic terrorism. Political globalisation, social globalisation and general globalisation 
positively affect unclear terrorism. Social globalisation has a positive impact on total 
terrorism. Possible channels and policy implications have been discussed.  
 Whereas the results are in line with Lutz and Lutz (2014, 2015) who have established 
a positive relationship between globalization and terrorism in Africa and the Middle East, in 
these concluding paragraphs it is relevant to further substantiate the negative effect and/or 
non-significant effect of economic globalization. There are three potential explanations to 
these effects, notably: (i) the relevance of globalization in reducing policy syndromes; (ii) the 
weight of trade openness vis-à-vis financial openness in the economic globalization indicator 
and (iii) an intuition on the relevance of economic globalization in terrorism when compared 
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with political and social globalization dynamics. These explanations are expanded in 
chronological order.  
 First, contrary to the stated hypothesis, the impacts of globalisation are not absolutely 
and/or exclusively negative on macroeconomic outcomes and positive on policy syndromes. 
In fact with respect to the policy syndrome of terrorism, some interactions within the global 
system have been associated with lower levels of terrorism (see Li & Schaub, 2004). Hence, 
globalisation can both be a curse and blessing, especially in the light of the fact that countries 
that are more integrated into the system could enjoy more stability whereas those that are less 
integrated continue to be confronted with shocks and disruptions (Bussman & Schneider, 
2007; Flaten & De Soysa, 2012). 
 Second, the appealing role of economic globalization could also be traceable to the 
influence of trade openness in relation to financial openness. In essence, while economic 
openness consists of both trade openness and financial openness, there is some consensus in 
the literature that trade openness has less detrimental macroeconomic outcomes when 
compared to financial openness in developing countries  (Rodrik & Subramanian, 2009; 
Asongu, 2014, 2017; Price & Elu, 2014; Motelle & Biekpe, 2015). It follows that the positive 
rewards of trade openness may decrease the propensity of citizens to resort to terror tactics as 
a means of voicing their concerns on the questionable benefits of economic globalization.  
 Third, from intuition economic globalization may be less unfriendly to terrorism 
compared to the other underlying forms of globalization because terrorist depend on trade and 
financial activities (related to openness) to fund their terrorists organizations (Raphaeli, 2003; 
Basile, 2004).  
Future research can improve the extant literature by assessing whether the suggested 
channels withstand empirical scrutiny. Moreover, investigating how the positive 
globalisation-terrorism nexus can be attenuated with institutions and other policy variables is 
worthwhile. Also in order to establish more targeted country-specific implications, it is vital 
to extend the analysis with other robust methodologies that are relevant to country-specific 
studies. This is essentially because, by definition, country-specific studies are eliminated from 
the adopted GMM approach in order to better control for endogeneity. This is essentially 
because, given the dynamic panel framework of the analysis, the correlation between the 
lagged dependent variable and error term is eliminated by differencing.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions (Measurement) Sources 
    
Political 
Globalisation 
Polglob “This captures the extent of political globalisation in terms of 
number of foreign embassies in a country, membership in 
international orgnisations, participation in UN security”.  
 
Dreher et al. (2010) 
 
    
Economic 
Globalisation 
Ecoglob “Overall economic globalisation (considers both the flow and 
the restrictions in a given country to derive this). The higher, 
the better social globalisation”. 
Dreher et al. (2010) 
 
    
Social  
Globalisation 
Socglob “Overall scores for the countries extent of social 
globalisation. The higher the better socially globalised the 
country”. 
Dreher et al. (2010) 
 
    
Globalisation  Glob This is an overall index that contains economic globalisation, 
social globalisation and political globalisation 
Dreher et al. (2010) 
 
    
Domestic 
terrorism 
Domter Number of Domestic terrorism incidents (in Ln)  
 
Ender et al. (2011) 
and 
Gailbulloev et al. 
(2012) 
 
   
Transnational 
terrorism  
Tranter Number of Transnational terrorism incidents (in Ln) 
   
Uuclear terrorism  Unclter Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear (in 
Ln) 
   
Total terrorism  Totter Total number of terrorism incidents (in Ln) 
    
Internet   Internet Internet penetration (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Growth   GDPg Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
    
 
Political Stability  
 
PS 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent 
means, including domestic violence and terrorism”  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Inclusive 
development 
IHDI Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index UNDP 
    
Military Expense    Milit Military Expenditure  (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  WGI: World Governance Indicators. UNDP: United Nations 
Development Program. Ln: Natural logarithm.  
 
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics (1996-2011) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
      
Political Globalisation  58.142 18.323 19.958 94.164 816 
Economic Globalisation  44.625 13.095 12.301 84.949 688 
Social Globalisation  28.519 11.247 5.773 65.033 816 
Globalisation  41.376 10.133 17.514 68.523 816 
Domestic terrorism  0.401 0.847 0.000 4.828 816 
Transnational terrorism 0.218 0.529 0.000 3.332 816 
Unclear terrorism 0.093 0.397 0.000 4.488 816 
Total terrorism 0.530 0.967 0.000 4.955 816 
Internet penetration  3.620 6.919 0.000 52 792 
GDP growth  4.863 7.297 -32.832 106.279 792 
Political Stability -0.572 0.954 -3.304 1.189 612 
Inclusive Development  1.521 6.926 0.127 0.809 553 
Military Expenditure 2.407 3.268 0.089 39.615 646 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
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Appendix 3: Correlation matrix (Uniform sample size: 295) 
              
Globalization Control variables Terrorism  
              
Polglob Ecoglob Socglob Glob Milit IHDI Internet GDPg PolS Domter Tranter Unclter Totter  
1.000 -0.088 0.124 0.495 -0.155 0.164 0.290 0.036 0.013 0.041 0.105 0.091 0.089 Polglob 
 1.000 0.675 0.755 -0.127 0.352 0.402 -0.074 0.404 -0.107 -0.098 -0.061 -0.135 Ecoglob 
  1.000 0.852 -0.159 0.274 0.585 -0.170 0.523 -0.180 -0.133 -0.097 -0.202 Socglob 
   1.000 -0.210 0.377 0.606 -0.097 0.425 0.116 -0.058 -0.031 -0.116 Glob 
    1.000 -0.085 -0.053 -0.053 -0.314 0.262 0.307 0.091 0.313 Milit 
     1.000 0.097 -0.069 0.089 0.085 0.035 -0.034 0.064 IHDI 
      1.000 -0.070 0.237 -0.092 -0.053 -0.059 -0.098 Internet 
       1.000 -0.034 0.040 -0.006 -0.069 0.018 GDPg 
        1.000 -0.509 -0.508 -0.257 -0.563 PolS 
         1.000 0.536 0.415 0.916 Domter 
          1.000 0.495 0.752 Tranter 
           1.000 0.606 Unclter 
            1.000 Totter 
              
Polglob: Political Globalisation. Ecoglob: Economic Globalisation. Socglob: Social Globalisation.  Glob: Globalisation. Milit: Military Expenditure.  IHDI: Inequality 
 Human Development Index. Internet: Internet Penetration. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. GDPg: Gross Domestic Product Growth. Educ: Secondary School enrolment.  
G.Exp: Government Expenditure. PolS: Political Stability.  Domter: Domestic Terrorism. Tranter: Transnational Terrorism. Unclter: Unclear Terrorism. Totter: Total Terrorism.   
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